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Abstract
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in such a
way that the sum of agents’ utilities is maximized under the system constraints. Such
allocation arises in several problems in the general area of communications, including
unicast (and multicast multi-rate) service on the Internet, as well as in applications
with (local) public goods, such as power allocation in wireless networks, spectrum
allocation, etc. Mechanisms that implement such allocations in Nash equilibrium
have also been studied but either they do not possess full implementation property,
or are given in a case-by-case fashion, thus obscuring fundamental understanding of
these problems.
In this paper we propose a unified methodology for creating mechanisms that fully
implement, in Nash equilibria, social utility maximizing functions arising in various
contexts where the constraints are convex. The construction of the mechanism is done
in a systematic way by considering the dual optimization problem. In addition to
the required properties of efficiency and individual rationality that such mechanisms
ought to satisfy, three additional design goals are the focus of this paper: a) the size of
the message space scaling linearly with the number of agents (even if agents’ types are
entire valuation functions), b) allocation being feasible on and off equilibrium, and
c) strong budget balance at equilibrium and also off equilibrium whenever demand
is feasible.
Terms: Mechanism Design, Information Elicitation, Foundations of Incentive Compatibility,
Auction Theory.
Key Words and Phrases: Multicast routing, proportional allocation, game theory, mechanism
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1 Introduction
In the general area of communications, a number of decentralized resource allocation
problems have been studied in the context of mechanism design. Such problems in-
clude unicast service on the Internet [Yang and Hajek, 2005], [Maheswaran and Basar,
2004], [Kakhbod and Teneketzis, 2013a], multi-rate multicast service on the Internet
[Kakhbod and Teneketzis, 2013b], [Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2013], power allocation
in wireless networks [Sharma and Teneketzis, 2012], [Han, 2012], [Zhang and Guizani,
2011], spectrum allocation [Huang et al., 2006] and pricing in a peer-to-peer network
[Neely, 2009]. The mechanism design framework is both appropriate and useful in the
above problems since these problems are motivated by the designer’s desire to allocate
resources efficiently in the presence of strategic agents who possess private information
about their level of satisfaction from the allocation.
Usually mechanism design solutions define a contract such that the induced game has
at least one equilibrium (Nash, Bayesian Nash, dominant strategy, etc) that corresponds
to the desired allocation. This is usually obtained with direct mechanisms by appealing
to the revelation principle [Börgers, 2013] [Garg et al., 2008a]. The drawbacks of these
direct approaches is that they require agents to quote their types (which may be entire
valuation functions) and that the induced game may have other extraneous equilibria
that are not efficient. In this paper, the focus is on full Nash implementation. Without
going into a formal definition, full Nash implementation refers to the design of contracts
such that only the designer’s most preferred outcome is realized as a result of interaction
between strategic agents (i.e. at Nash equilibria (NE)), as opposed to general mechanism
design, where other less preferred outcomes are also possible. Thus implementation is
more stringent and is capable of producing better allocations. Readers may refer to
[Jackson, 2001] for a survey on implementation theory.
Concentrating on those proposed solutions in the literature that guarantee full Nash
implementation, one observes a fragmented and case-by-case approach. One may ask how
fundamentally different are for example the problems of unicast service on the Internet,
multicast multi-rate service on the Internet, power allocation in wireless networks, etc, to
justify a separately designed mechanism for each case. Alternatively, one may ask what
are the common features in all these problems that can lead to a unified mechanism
design approach. These questions provide the motivation for the work presented in this
paper.
In particular, our starting point is to state a class of problems as social utility maxi-
design, full implementation, Nash equilibrium.
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mization under linear inequality/equality constraints. We then proceed by characterizing
their solution through Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Analyzing the dual opti-
mization problem is essential in our approach, because it hints at how the taxation part
of the mechanism should be designed. Subsequently we define a general mechanism and
show that it results in full Nash implementation when the agents’ valuation functions
are their private information3. Since the application domain of interest is in the area of
communications, we give special emphasis on the size of the message space (as a conse-
quence, VCG-type mechanisms, see [Krishna, 2009, Section 5.3], [Börgers, 2013, Chap-
ter 5], [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, Chapter 10], [Garg et al., 2008a], [Garg et al.,
2008b], are inappropriate since they require quoting of types, which are entire valuation
function in this set-up). A notable exception is the work [Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2009,
Section 5] and [Yang and Hajek, 2007] that adapts VCG for a small message space (one
dimensional message per user) and guarantees off-equilibrium feasibility. However in
their work, full implementation can’t be guaranteed and there is possibility of extrane-
ous equilibria. In this paper, the message space scales linearly with number of agents so
that the proposed mechanism is scalable.
In addition to the stated goal of getting optimal allocations at all Nash equilibria,
there are other auxiliary properties that are sought in a mechanism. An important such
property is individual rationality ; this requires that agents are weakly better off at NE
than not participating in the mechanism at all. The purpose of this is to ensure that
agents are willing to sign the contract in the first place. Another important property
is strong budget balance (SBB) at NE. This requires that at NE, the total monetary
transfer between agents (assuming quasi-linear utility functions) is zero. The unified
mechanism proposed in this work possesses both these properties.
Finally, a mechanism may be endowed with auxiliary properties off equilibrium. These
are meant to improve the applicability in practical settings. For instance, the NE is inter-
preted as the convergent outcome when agents in the system “learn” the game by playing
it repeatedly, which implies that during this process the messages (and thus allocations
and taxes) are off equilibrium. In our opinion, the most important auxiliary property is
feasibility of allocation on and off equilibrium. This property is essential whenever
the system constraints are hard constraints on resources and cannot be violated by any
means. For instance, the contract should not promise rate allocations to agents that ever
violate the capacity constraints of the network links because such a contract would be
3Use of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept itself requires some justification, since it applies only
to games with complete information. This issue is discussed further in Section 5. However, in this
work we accept the justification given by Reichelstein and Reiter in [Reichelstein and Reiter, 1988]
and Groves and Ledyard in [Groves and Ledyard, 1977] based on the second interpretation of Nash
equilibrium as the fixed point of an (possibly myopic) adjustment process, [Nash, 1950].
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practically invalid since it promises something that can never be achieved. Note that, at
equilibrium the allocation has to satisfy the constraints by definition, so feasibility always
holds at NE. Another auxiliary property is SBB off equilibrium. Similarly this property
guarantees that in a practical situation where a dynamic learning process converges to
NE, each step of this process leaves a zero balance. One of the main features of the work
in this paper is that the allocation scheme is designed to guarantee both feasibility off
equilibrium and SBB off equilibrium whenever demand is feasible. Specifically, feasibil-
ity is achieved by utilizing proportional allocation. Proportional allocation refers to the
idea of using agents’ demands to create their allocation by projecting their overall de-
mand vector back down to the boundary of the feasible region whenever it is outside of it.
This way everyone receives allocation that is proportional to their original demand. This
allocation method generalizes the idea of proportional allocation that was introduced in
mechanism design framework by [Maheswaran and Basar, 2004], [Yang and Hajek, 2005]
for unicast network with one capacity constraint and for stochastic control of networks
in [Kelly et al., 1998], as well as by the authors in [Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2014],
[Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2013].
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• A unified framework is proposed for full implementation (in NE) mechanism design
in social utility maximization problems with convex constraints.
• The proposed mechanism has small message space (although agents’ types are entire
valuation functions) and is scalable.
• The proposed mechanism is individually rational and strongly budget balanced at
NE.
• The proposed mechanism lends itself to practical implementation (through learn-
ing algorithms) because allocation is feasible even off equilibrium (and is strongly
budget balanced off equilibrium when demand is feasible).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe three examples
relevant in communications and formulate the general centralized allocation problem
that we wish to implement. In Section 3 we describe the proposed mechanism. Section 4
contains all the proofs of full implementation. Section 5 contains off-equilibrium results
and discusses their relevance. Finally in Section 6 we conclude with a discussion of
important generalizations of this set-up.
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2 Motivation and Centralized Problem
In this section we start by describing various important resource allocation problems that
arise in communications and to which our generalized methodology applies (in Section 6
we discuss generalizations that will help solve an even larger class of problems than the
ones described below). After the examples, we define a general centralized optimization
problem, (CP), that covers all the examples. Following that we state general assumptions
on (CP) (some additional technical assumptions will be made in Section 4).
2.1 Interesting Resource allocation problems in Communications
Unicast Transmission on the Internet
Consider agents on the Internet from set N = {1, . . . , N}, where each agent i ∈ N is a
pair of source and destination that communicate via a pre-decided route consisting of
links in Li. All the agents together communicate on the network consisting of links
in L = ∪i∈NLi. Since each link in the network has a limited capacity, this results in
constraints on the information rate allocated to each agent. Considering a scenario where
agents have (concave) utility functions/profiles {vi(·)}i∈N that measure the satisfaction
received by agents for various allocated rates, we can write the social utility optimization
problem as
max
x∈RN
+
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (CPu)
s.t.
∑
i∈Nl
αlixi 6 c
l ∀ l ∈ L. (1)
In the above Nl , {i ∈ N | l ∈ Li} is the set of agents present on link l, c
l is the capacity
of link l and αli are positive weights meant to differentiate between true information rate
xi and its imposition on capacity of the links of the network through coding rate, packet
error etc.
The above feasible set is a polytope in the first quadrant of RN
+
and is created by faces
that have outward normal vectors pointing away from the origin. For the details of a
full implementation mechanism specifically for the unicast problem readers may refer to
[Jain and Walrand, 2010], [Kakhbod and Teneketzis, 2013a], [Sinha and Anastasopoulos,
2014].
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Public Goods
In contrast to the private consumption problem above, there are public goods problems
where the resources are shared directly between agents instead of sharing via constraints.
The unicast problem was a scenario where allocation of rate to one agent on a link would
imply less available rate for other agents on the link (because of the capacity constraint)
- the rate allocation thus is private in this case. In contrast to this, if there is a resource
allocation problem where two or more agents can simultaneously use the same resource
then it will be classified as a public goods problem. A well-studied example of this kind
is the wireless transmission with interference, in which the power level of each agent
affects any other agent through the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR).
Here we consider a simplified scalar version of the public goods problem for a system
of agents from the set N in the following form
max
x∈R+
∑
i∈N
vi(x) (CPpb)
s.t. x ∈ X, (2)
where X is a convex subset of R+. Note that the argument for all utility functions is
the same; since there is one public good being simultaneously used by all the agents (for
which x marks the usage level). We rewrite such a problem in the constrained form
max
x∈RN
+
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (CPpb)
s.t. x1 = x2 = x3 = . . . = xN (3a)
s.t. x1 ∈ X. (3b)
The treatment when x is a vector is not very different and we discuss this in the general-
izations at the end. Implementation for the public goods problem is the most studied of
all the examples in this paper, see [Groves and Ledyard, 1977], [Hurwicz, 1979], [Chen,
2002]. The distinction from private goods is that generally public goods problems require
handling the “free-rider” problem [Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Section 11.C].
Local Public Goods
Another important resource allocation problem in communications is the local public
goods problem. The basic idea of direct sharing of resources is same as above but in here
the sharing is only among agents locally. So there are local groups of agents for whom
the allocation has to be the same, but this common allocation can be different from one
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group to the next. If we divide the set of agents into disjoint local groups: N = ⊔k∈KNk,
then the centralized problem can be written as
max
x∈RK+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
vi(xk) (CPlpb)
s.t. xk ∈ Xk ∀ k ∈ K, (4)
with (Xk)k∈K being convex subsets of R+. As before, we would restate it as
max
x∈RK
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
vi(xi) (CPlpb)
s.t. xi = xj ∀ i, j ∈ Nk, ∀ k ∈ K (5a)
s.t. xjk ∈ Xk for some jk ∈ Nk, ∀ k ∈ K. (5b)
Local public goods problems are relevant in those network settings where there is direct
interaction between local agents. Wireless transmission is an example of this, each agent
affects and is affected by other agents’ transmission through interference (SINR) and
it is reasonable to assume that this effect is only local and that agents situated far
enough (either spatially or in the frequency domain) will not affect each other. Readers
may refer to [Sharma and Teneketzis, 2012] for a specific mechanism for the local public
goods problem.
2.2 General Centralized Problem
Here we state the generic form of the centralized optimization problem that we wish to
fully implement. The resource allocation problem is defined for a system with agents
indexed in the set N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, who have utility functions {vi(·)}i∈N. The objective
is to find the optimum allocation of a single infinitely divisible good that maximizes the
sum of utilities subject to constraints on the system. The allocation made to agents will
be denoted by the vector x ∈ RN
+
, with xi being the allocation to agent i. The centralized
optimization problem that we consider is
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (CP)
s.t. x ∈ RN
+
(C1)
s.t. A⊤l x 6 cl ∀ l ∈ L where Al ∈ R
N, cl > 0. (C2)
The set L = {1, 2, . . . , L} indexes all the constraints and Al, cl are all parameters of the
optimization problem. It is easy to see that the above set-up covers equality constraints
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(such as from the public goods example), since we can always write x1 = . . . = xN as
x1 > x2 > . . . > xN > x1.
Denote by C ⊂ RN
+
the above feasible set. Note that C is a polytope in the first
quadrant of RN, possibly of a lower dimension than N (due to equality constraints). For
convenience, we denote by Li the set of constraints that involve agent i, i.e. Li = {l ∈
L | Ali 6= 0} with Li , |Li|. Conversely, define N
l as the set of agents involved at link l
i.e. Nl = {i ∈ N | l ∈ Li} with N
l , |Nl|.
2.3 Assumptions
Stated below are the assumptions on (CP) some of which restrict the environment {vi}i∈N
and some the constraint set C. Some additional technical assumptions will be introduced
later to handle the degenerate cases.
(A1)
For any i ∈ N, vi(·) is a strictly concave and continuously double differentiable
function R+ → R.
The purpose of strict concavity is to have a (CP) whose solution can be described suffi-
ciently by the KKT conditions (note that monotonicity is not assumed).
(A2)
The optimal solution x⋆ is bounded such that x⋆ ∈ ×Ni=1 (di, D) for some 0 <
di < D, with d = (di)
N
i=1 ∈ C being arbitrarily close to 0 and D being large
enough.
This assumption is used to eliminate corner cases of (CP), since they usually require
special treatment and make the exposition unnecessarily convoluted. Note that we can
always select a point d ∈ C that is arbitrarily close to 0 because of assumption (A3)
below.
The next two assumptions restrict the constraint set C.
(A3) The vector 0 ∈ C, i.e. x = 0 is feasible.
Since we are considering problems where all the variables xi have a physical interpreta-
tion, it is natural to consider a constraint set whereby every agent getting 0 allocation
is feasible. Note that this also explains the choice cl > 0.
(A4)
For any constraint l ∈ L in (C2) there are two distinct i, j ∈ N such that
Ali, Alj 6= 0. This can also be stated as N
l > 2 ∀ l ∈ L where Nl is as defined
after (CP).
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This ensures that there is indeed competition for all the constraints that could possibly
be active at optimum. Again this is used to avoid special treatment of corner cases.
Denote by V0 the set of all possible functions {vi(·)}i∈N that satisfy the above assump-
tions. Then V0 will be the environment for our mechanism design problem.
We will also make an assumption on the overall utility of agents in the system.
(A5)
Apart from the valuation part vi(xi) there is linear taxation component as well
that affects agents’ utilities. So overall utility of agent i is
ui(x, t) = vi(xi) − ti. (6)
2.4 KKT conditions
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (CP) is
L(x, λ, µ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) −
∑
l∈L
λl
(
A⊤l x − cl
)
+
∑
i∈N
µixi (7)
Due to assumption (A2), we can state the KKT conditions only in terms of λ⋆ and not
involve µ⋆.
1. Primal Feasibility: x⋆ ∈ C.
2. Dual Feasibility: For all l ∈ L, λ⋆l > 0.
3. Complimentary Slackness: For all l ∈ L,
λ⋆l
(
A⊤l x
⋆ − cl
)
= 0. (8)
4. Stationarity: For all i ∈ N,
v′i(x
⋆
i ) =
∑
l∈L
Aliλ
⋆
l . (9)
We will see later that taxation will help us in achieving these KKT conditions when
agents play the induced game from the mechanism. For that it will be important to
think of the Lagrange multipliers above as “prices” where there will be one price per
constraint.
9
3 Mechanism
In this section we describe the proposed mechanism. Description of the mechanism
is divided into two parts - allocation and taxes. A mechanism in the Hurwicz-Reiter
framework consists of an environment, an outcome space, a (centralized) correspondence
between the environment and the outcome space, a message space and a contract from
the message space to the outcome space. In our case the environment is set V0 of all
possible valuation functions {vi(·)}i∈N. The outcome space is the Cartesian product of
the set of all possible allocations and taxes, which is the set C × RN ⊂ RN
+
× RN. The
correspondence between V0 and C is provided implicitly by the centralized problem (CP),
where for each {vi(·)}i∈N we get an optimal allocation x
⋆ by solving (CP) (explicitly one
can solve KKT to define x⋆, together with corresponding Lagrange multipliers). This
leaves the designer with the task of designing the message space and the contract.
The message space for our mechanism is S = ×i∈NSi with Si = (di,+∞)×RLi+ where
messages from agents are of the form si = (yi, pi) with pi = (p
l
i)l∈Li and the total
message is denoted by s = (si)i∈N = (y, P) with y = (yi)i∈N and P = (pi)i∈N. The
message si = (yi, pi) is to be interpreted as follows: yi is the level of demand from
agent i and pi is the vector of prices that he believes everyone else should pay for the
respective constraints. The contract h : S→ RN
+
× RN will specify allocation and taxes
for all agents based on the message s, i.e., h(s) = (hx,i(s), ht,i(s))i∈N.
This contract along with agents’ utilities will give rise to a one-shot game G =
(N,×i∈NSi, {ûi}i∈N) between agents in N where action sets are Si and utilities are
ûi(s) = ui(x, t) = vi(xi) − ti = vi(hx,i(s)) − ht,i(s). (10)
Information assumptions We assume that for any agent i, vi(·) is his private informa-
tion. The mechanism designer doesn’t know {vi(·)}i∈N but knows the set V0 to which
they belong. Also the constraints (C1) and (C2) in (CP) (along with the assumptions)
are common knowledge i.e. known to agents and the mechanism designer.
We say that the mechanism fully implements the centralized problem (CP) if all
Nash equilibria of the induced game G correspond to the unique allocation x⋆ - solution
of (CP), and additionally individual rationality is satisfied i.e. agents are weakly better-
off participating in the contract at equilibrium than not participating at all.
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x1 = d1
x2 = d2
θ
y
x
x = y
d
C
x2/y2
x1/y1
Figure 1: An illustration of the allocation for N = 2
3.1 Allocation
We first describe the allocation in the case where the constraints in (C2) do not have any
effective degeneracy i.e. equality constraints. This distinction is based on whether the
feasible set C has a proper interior or not. Clearly when there are no equality constraints,
the constraint set will have an interior.
For allocation in this case, we first choose a point θ in the interior of the feasible set
such that
θ ∈ int(C) ∩ ×Ni=1 (0, di) (11)
Note that we can guarantee the existence of θ since by assumption (A3), 0 ∈ C and clearly
C being intersection of half-planes, is a convex set. Since d can be made arbitrarily close
to 0, the same holds for θ as well.
Before formally defining the allocation, we define it informally with the help of Fig. 1.
For any demand y ∈ Sy , ×
N
i=1 (di,+∞), the allocation x will be equal to y if y is inside
the feasibility region C. Otherwise the allocation will be the intersection point between
the boundary of the feasibility region C and the line joining θ with y (that intersection
point which lies between θ and y). The figure shows two different possible y’s and their
corresponding allocation x. The shaded region represents that part of C that can never
be allocated. Note that since ‖d‖, ‖θ‖ ≈ 0 this is a very small region and thus it doesn’t
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significantly affect the generality of results presented in this paper. Also this can be seen
as a partial justification for why assumption (A2) was needed.
Formally, in case of feasibility set C not having any degeneracy, for a demand y ∈ Sy,
the allocation x generated by the contract is
x =
{
y if y ∈ C
y0 if y /∈ C,
(12)
where y0 is the point on the boundary of C which is also on the line joining θ with y.
Explicitly, if the above intersection happens on the hyperplane Fl = {A
⊤
l x = cl} then we
can express y0 as
y0 − θ = α0(y− θ) with α0 =
cl −A
⊤
l θ
A⊤l (y − θ)
(13)
The above allocation mapping is an extension of generalized proportional allocation
idea (see [Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2013] and [Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2014]), but
modified in accordance with the generality of the problem (CP) and also so that points in
the interior of C are covered as well. It is easy to verify in above that for y /∈ C, because
of the way proportional allocation is defined, the expression for α0 above is well-defined
and positive. Also, if one extends the definition of y0 to the boundary i.e y ∈ ∂C then
it is easy to see that y0 = y and α0 = 1.
Another useful explicit way of defining α0 is as follows.
α0 = min
l∈L
αl0>0
αl0 with α
l
0 =
cl −A
⊤
l θ
A⊤l (y− θ)
∀ l ∈ L (14)
In the above, cl −A
⊤
l θ > 0 for all l ∈ L (because θ ∈ int(C)), but A
⊤
l (y− θ) might be
positive, negative or zero (since we are considering all l ∈ L and not restricting ourselves
to appropriate regions as before). The purpose of taking minimum of αl0 over positive
ones is to find the “innermost” (or closest) constraint to θ in the (positive) direction of
y − θ.
Now we turn our attention to the case of degenerate feasible set. Since we are mainly
interested in dealing with problems of (local) public goods nature, we define an alternate
characterization of the constraint set only for those cases4. We can rewrite constraints
from (C2) to explicitly account for equalities. For this consider disjoint sets of agents
4This generalizes in a straightforward way.
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(Nk)k∈K, where K = {1, . . . , K}, such that N = ⊔k∈KNk, and the partition (Nk)k∈K of N
serves the purpose of grouping agents by locality. Thus the rewritten constraints are
xi = xj ∀ i, j ∈ Nk, ∀ k ∈ K (C2a)
A⊤l x 6 cl ∀ l ∈ L˜ ⊆ L, (C2b)
where L˜ is the subset of original constraints - the ones remaining after equality constraints
have been separated. Without stating formally, we assume that the constraints in (C2b)
do not introduce any further degeneracy. Now one can consider a further refinement of
above to state the constraints only in terms of free variables and thus containing only
inequality constraints. For this define x˜ = (xjk)k∈K where jk represents the agent with
lowest index from Nk (to make the representation unique). Clearly this is exactly the
set of free variables from above and we can rewrite (C2) as
A˜⊤l x˜ 6 cl ∀ l ∈ L˜, (C2c)
with A˜l ∈ R
K being derived from Al by using (C2a) explicitly. Recall that from as-
sumption (A4) we had at least 2 agents on each constraint, in cases such as above we
extend that to have at least 2 agents per constraint in the above definition. We denote
by C˜ ⊂ RK
+
the effective polytope in the x˜−space, created by the constraints in (C2c).
Coming back to allocation, for demand y ∈ Sy we first create modified demand y˜ ∈
×Ki=1(d˜i,+∞) ⊂ RK+ as follows:
y˜k =
1
Nk
∑
i∈Nk
yi ∀ k ∈ K, (16)
i.e. averaging quoted y’s from each group to get one representative demand. Then
proportional allocation, as above, is performed on y˜ and the feasibility set C˜ to get x˜ ∈ C˜
(note that θ˜ - the restriction of θ to appropriate coordinates, will be used in place of θ).
This proxy allocation x˜ is finally converted back, using (C2a), to get x ∈ C.
3.2 Taxes
For any agent i, we define his tax ti as
ti =
∑
l∈Li
tli (17a)
tli = Alixip¯
l
−i +
(
pli − p¯
l
−i
)2
+ η p¯l
−ip
l
i
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
(17b)
13
p¯l
−i ,
1
Nl − 1
∑
j∈Nl
j 6=i
plj (17c)
With η > 0 being a positive constant.
In the results section we will see how the various terms in the tax above represent dif-
ferent KKT conditions. Note for example the price-taking nature that Alixip¯
l
−i induces;
here the agent is supposed to pay for his allocation but the price at which he has to pay
is decided by others.
4 Equilibrium Results
In this section we state and prove lemmas that will give us the desired full implementation
property for the mechanism defined in Section 3. Later in this section, the presented
mechanism will be modified slightly to get an additional property of SBB at NE.
The main result of full implementation would require us to prove that all pure strategy
NE of gameG result in allocation x⋆ - the unique solution of (CP), and to show individual
rationality. The method for proving this result is as follows: firstly we show (Lemmas 4.1-
4.5) that for any pure strategy NE the corresponding allocation and quoted prices must
satisfy the KKT conditions from Section 2.4. Since by assumptions KKT conditions are
both necessary and sufficient, this would mean that if pure strategy NE exist (unique or
multiple), the corresponding allocation would have to be the solution of (CP) with quoted
prices as the optimal Lagrange multipliers. Then we show existence (in Lemma 4.6) by
explicitly writing out the messages that achieve the solution of (CP) and showing that
there are no profitable unilateral deviations from those. Finally individual rationality
will be shown (in Lemma 4.7).
For Lemma 4.5, we would need to distinguish between various cases arising from the
general form of (CP). We will make specific assumptions when necessary.
Lemma 4.1 (Primal Feasibility). For any message s = (y, P) ∈ S with corresponding
allocation x, we have x ∈ C i.e. allocation is always feasible.
Proof. Consider the case where C doesn’t consist of equality constraints i.e. is not
degenerate. For y ∈ C, feasibility of allocation x is obvious. For y /∈ C, the allocation is
chosen on the boundary of C, hence it is feasible as well (note that C is closed).
In case when C is degenerate, the dummy allocation x˜ is feasible w.r.t. C˜ using the
above argument. But since the allocation x is produced from x˜ whilst satisfying the equal-
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ity constraints, this means that x satisfies both the inequality and equality constraints
and hence is feasible.
Lemma 4.2 (Equal Prices). At any NE s = (y, P) of the game G, ∀ l ∈ L and ∀
i ∈ Nl, we have pli = p
l i.e. all agents on a constraint quote the same price for that
constraint.
Proof. Suppose there exists a constraint l ∈ L such that (plj)j∈Nl are not all equal. Then
there exists an agent i ∈ Nl such that pli > p¯
l
−i (this is clear from definition in (17c)).
Consider the downwards price deviation pli
′
= p¯l
−i > 0 for this agent (whilst keeping
all other values in si the same). The difference in utility will be
∆ûi = ûi(s
′
i, s−i) − ûi(si, s−i) = −(p
l
i
′
− p¯l
−i)
2 + (pli − p¯
l
−i)
2
−η p¯l
−ip
l
i
′ (
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
+ η p¯l
−ip
l
i
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
(18a)
= (pli − p¯
l
−i)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ η p¯l
−i(p
l
i − p¯
l
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
> 0 (18b)
Hence such a unilateral deviation is profitable. Therefore at NE, all quoted prices for
any constraint have to be the same.
Since we have shown that there is a common price pl for any constraint l ∈ L, here
onwards we can refer only to pl’s instead of pli’s. Here onwards, whenever we refer to
quoted price P, it is to be interpreted as (pl)l∈L.
Lemma 4.3 (Dual Feasibility). For any l ∈ L, pl > 0.
Proof. This is obvious since quoted prices are all non-negative.
Lemma 4.4 (Complimentary Slackness). For any NE s = (y, P) of game G with
corresponding allocation x, we have for any l ∈ L
pl
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)
= 0 (19)
Proof. Suppose there exists a constraint l ∈ L such that, at NE, pl > 0 and cl > A⊤l x.
We will take a downwards price deviation pli
′
= pl − ε > 0 for any agent i ∈ Nl. Again
we can write the difference in utility as
∆ûi = −(p
l
i
′
− p¯l
−i)
2 + 0− η p¯l
−ip
l
i
′ (
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
+ η p¯l
−ip
l
i
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
(20a)
= −(−ε)2 + η pl (ε)
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
= −ε (ε− a) (20b)
with a = η pl
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
> 0. Now choosing 0 < ε < min(a, pl) this can be made into
a profitable deviation.
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Next we have the lemma for the stationarity property from KKT. For this we have to
make assumptions on the feasible set C.
(A6)
A˜l ∈ R
K
+
∀ l ∈ L˜ (21)
where A˜l was defined in (C2c) (Section 3.1).
The above clearly translates into Al ∈ R
N
+
∀ l ∈ L in case there is no degeneracy. But
when there is degeneracy, the above assumption states that the effective polytope C˜ in
the x˜−space has faces whose outward normals are pointing away from the origin.
Lemma 4.5 (Stationarity). At any NE s = (y, P) of game G with corresponding
allocation x, we have for any agent i ∈ N,
v′i(xi) =
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l (22)
Proof. For any agent i ∈ N we can write
∂ûi(s)
∂yi
=
(
v′i(xi) −
∂ti
∂xi
)
∂xi
∂yi
(23)
Note that β ≡ ∂xi/∂yi isn’t always defined, since the allocation is continuous but only
piecewise differentiable for y /∈ C. But right and left derivatives are always defined.
Noting that v′i(xi) −
∂ti
∂xi
= 0 is equivalent to (22) (using previous lemmas characterizing
NE), it will be sufficient for us if we show that β > 0. Since then without making
v′i(xi) −
∂ti
∂xi
= 0 there is always an upwards or downwards deviation in yi to make agent
i strictly better-off.
For y ∈ C we have xi = yi, therefore β = 1 6= 0. Otherwise, first consider the case
where C is non-degenerate. Then
xi = θi + α0 (yi − θi) with α0 =
cl −A
⊤
l θ
A⊤l (y− θ)
(24a)
∂xi
∂yi
= α0 + (yi − θi)
∂α0
∂yi
with
∂α0
∂yi
=
−α0Ali
A⊤l (y − θ)
(24b)
⇒
∂xi
∂yi
= α0
(
1−
Ali (yi − θi)
A⊤l (y− θ)
)
= α0
( ∑
j∈Nl\{i}
Alj (yj − θj)
)
(24c)
Noting that α0 > 0 and that due to assumption (A4) there are always at least two agents
on any constraint, clearly the above is positive (since θj < dj < yj ∀ j).
In the case when C does have equality constraints, note that allocations are created by
composing the maps y
A
7−→ y˜
B
7−→ x˜
C
7−→ x where B is proportional allocation on the set C˜
16
and A,C are linear with positive coefficients5. Thus using the fact that for proportional
allocation we have β > 0 (from above) and that A,C have positive coefficients, we clearly
have β > 0 here as well.
This completes the necessary part of our proof. The argument in the previous Lemmas
applied to pure strategy NE if there exited any. Now we will prove the existence of pure
strategy NE which will give the optimal allocation x⋆.
Lemma 4.6 (Existence). For game G, there exists NE s = (y, P) ∈ S such that the
corresponding allocation x and prices (pl)l∈L satisfy the KKT conditions as x
⋆ and
(λ⋆l )l∈L, respectively.
Proof. This proof will be done in two separate parts: first we will show that there
exists s ∈ S such that the allocation through the contract is x⋆ and prices are Lagrange
multipliers (λ⋆l)l∈L. Secondly, we will show that for all claimed NE points, there doesn’t
exist a unilateral deviation that is profitable.
Existence of prices that match Lagrange multipliers λ⋆l is obvious, since agents can
quote any price in R+ and dual feasibility says that λ
⋆
l > 0. For allocation to be the
same as x⋆, notice that due to assumption (A2) all possible solutions x⋆ lie in the set
Y , C ∩ Sy with Sy = ×
N
i=1 (di,+∞). Quoted demand y can be anywhere in the set
Sy and for y ∈ C (i.e. y ∈ Y) the allocation is x = y and therefore each point x ∈ Y is
achievable as allocation by quoting the same point y = x ∈ Y. (However also note that
points on the boundary of Y are achievable as allocation by many y’s outside Y as well.)
Now we will check for unilateral profitable deviations. When quoted demand creates
allocation as x⋆ and the quoted prices are equal and equal to λ⋆, the utility for any agent
i is
ûi(s) = vi(x
⋆
i ) − x
⋆
i
∑
l∈Li
Aliλ
⋆
l (25)
Due to the fact that f(x) = vi(x) − x
∑
l∈Li
Aliλ
⋆
l is strictly concave and f
′(x⋆i ) = 0
(Stationarity) we can conclude that x⋆i is a global maximizer of f. With this we have
ûi(s) = vi(x
⋆
i ) − x
⋆
i
∑
l∈Li
Aliλ
⋆
l > vi(xi) − xi
∑
l∈Li
Aliλ
⋆
l (26a)
> vi(xi) − xi
∑
l∈Li
Aliλ
⋆
l −
∑
l∈Li
(
pli − λ
⋆
l
)2
−
∑
l∈Li
η pliλ
⋆
l
(
cl −A
⊤
l x
)2
(26b)
The above is true for any (xj)j∈N and
(
pli
)
l∈Li
non-negative and final inequality holds
because the additional terms are non-positive. Now any unilateral deviation (s′i, s−i)
5Since they consist of averaging, (16), and assigning same value to multiple positions.
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from agent i will result in utility for agent i which has the form as in (26b). Hence we
have proved that with unilateral deviations from messages that have allocation x⋆ and
prices λ⋆, the corresponding agent can never be strictly better off.
Lemma 4.7 (Individual Rationality). For any NE s = (y, P) of game G with cor-
responding allocation x and taxes t, we have for any i ∈ N
ui(x, t) > ui(0, 0) (27)
Proof. Recall that ui(x, t) = vi(xi) − ti. For any agent i ∈ N, define
f(z) , vi(z) − z
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l (28)
Note that ui(0, 0) = vi(0) = f(0) and at NE ui(x, t) = vi(xi) − xi
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l = f(xi)
(also recall that except the first term, all other tax terms go to zero at NE, refer (17b)).
By stationarity property we know f′(xi) = v
′
i(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l = 0 and by assumption
(A1) it is clear that f(·) is strictly concave. Therefore f′(y) > 0 for 0 < y < xi and we
can claim by mean value theorem that f(xi) > f(0).
Theorem 4.8 (Full Implementation). All Nash equilibria s = (y, P) of the game G
have the same corresponding allocation x. Furthermore, this allocation is identical
to the unique solution of (CP) i.e. x = x⋆. Also, all agents are weakly better-off at
equilibrium than by not participating at all.
Proof. Thus from Lemma 4.6 there exists at least one pure strategy NE. From Lemma 4.1-
4.5, allocation x at any NE has to satisfy KKT conditions and knowing that KKT condi-
tions are necessary and sufficient for optimality, it is clear that x = x⋆. Finally, individual
rationality was shown in Lemma 4.7 and with this we have our full implementation re-
sult.
4.1 Strong Budget Balance (at equilibrium)
In this section we present a modification in the above mechanism so that in addition to
above properties we also have SBB, i.e.,
∑
i∈N ti = 0 at those equilibria where y ∈ C.
The message space and allocation x is exactly same as before, the only modification
will be to the taxes. Whenever the quoted demand is feasible, we have x = y. So
from (17a), (17b) and previous lemmas we can write total tax at NE as∑
i∈N
ti =
∑
i∈N
∑
l∈Li
tli =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Nl
tli =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Nl
Aliyip
l (29)
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To achieve SBB, our approach is to redistribute the above total tax amongst all the
agents so that the amount of money received by an agent will not be controlled by that
agent i.e. it will be only a function of y, p quoted by other agents. This will ensure
that strategic decisions are still same as before and thus we would continue to have all
the previous properties (Lemmas 4.1-4.6). Furthermore, we will redistribute taxes per
constraint. So for any constraint l ∈ L,
∑
i∈Nl t
l
i will be redistributed only amongst
agents in Nl. After appropriately redistributing the taxes, we will check individual
rationality at equilibrium once again since the total tax paid by an agent might have a
different value now. The reason we present SBB as a side result is that one can always use
such a redistribution technique and thus SBB generally reduces to appropriate algebraic
manipulation and can usually be added later on in the mechanism (for problems of these
types).
Let T li be the new tax where analogously the old tax (from (17b)) was t
l
i. Then the
total tax for any agent i is Ti =
∑
l∈Li
T li . From above discussion, what we want is
T li = t
l
i − f
l
i
(
(yj, p
l
j)j∈Nl
j 6=i
)
(30)
for any i ∈ N and l ∈ Li. The function f
l
i will be defined below.
For l ∈ L such that Nl > 3, in case where Ali > 0 ∀ i ∈ N
l, we have
fli ≡ f
l
i,1 =
1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
j 6=i
Aljyj
(
p¯l
−i −
plj
Nl − 1
)
(31)
when there are negative coefficients in Ali, we can define f
l
i in the same manner as above,
except that coefficients for those j that are involved in an equality constraint will be
(scaled)6 A˜lj instead of Alj.
For l ∈ L such that Nl = 2 (assuming Nl = {i, j}), we divide the redistribution into 2
cases: first we consider the case Ali, Alj > 0, for this we have
fli ≡ f
l
i,1 = Aljyjp
l
j. (32)
If the coefficients Ali are not positive then we are essentially into the degenerate case,
where |Ali| = |Alj| = 1 with opposite signs. For this we have f
l
i ≡ f
l
i,1 = 0 and same for
agent j.
With the modified tax we will denote the new game as G′.
6the scaling factor being the inverse of the number of agents on l that are involved in constraints that
make their allocation equal.
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Lemma 4.9 (Strong Budget Balance at NE). For the game G′, at all NE s = (y, P)
where y ∈ C we have ∑
i∈N
Ti =
∑
i∈N
∑
l∈Li
T li = 0 (SBB)
Proof. Recall that due to Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4, at NE we have∑
i∈N
ti =
∑
i∈N
∑
l∈Li
tli =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Nl
tli =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Nl
Aliyip
l (33)
For completing the proof, it will be sufficient to show
∑
i∈Nl t
l
i =
∑
i∈Nl f
l
i for any l ∈ L,
at NE. Let’s begin with links with Nl = 2 (where Nl = {i, j}). In case Ali, Alj > 0 the
total payment is
fli + f
l
j = Aljyjp
l
j +Aliyip
l
i =
∑
k∈Nl
Alkykp
l. (34)
In the degenerate case, the tax paid by agents i, j at NE is yip
l, yjp
l with opposite signs.
But note that yi = yj at NE, since we are in the degenerate case. Hence the total tax is
zero, which is the same as fli + f
l
j. Now for other links,∑
i∈Nl
1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
j 6=i
Ajlyj
(
p¯l
−i −
plj
Nl − 1
)
=
1
Nl − 2
∑
i∈Nl
∑
j∈Nl
j 6=i
Ajlyj
(
p¯l
−j −
pli
Nl − 1
)
(35a)
=
Nl − 1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
Ajlyjp¯
l
−j −
1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
∑
i∈Nl
i 6=j
Ajlyj
pli
Nl − 1
(35b)
=
Nl − 1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
Ajlyjp¯
l
−j −
1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
Ajlyjp¯
l
−j =
∑
j∈Nl
Ajlyjp¯
l
−j =
∑
j∈Nl
Ajlyjp
l (35c)
(the proof when Alj are possibly negative also follows from above after explicitly using
that equality constraints would make some allocations equal to each other at NE)
After this, we have to check individual rationality. In cases when there is no degen-
eracy in C, due to assumption (A6), Ali > 0 ∀ l, i. This means that with f
l
i we have
redistributed taxes by paying agents back, thus the redistribution is indeed non-negative
(can be seen explicitly from (31) and (32)). Thus if the NE was individually rational
without this redistribution, it will continue to be so now.
For the cases involving degeneracy, for links associated with equality constraints the
redistribution is zero. So individual rationality isn’t affected. For other links, individ-
ual rationality follows from the argument in the previous paragraph after noting that
effectively A˜li were used in place of Ali for defining f
l
i (and by (A6), A˜li > 0).
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5 Off-equilibrium Results
In this section we discuss (and prove) additional off-equilibrium properties of the mecha-
nism. The original requirements of full implementation are only restricted to equilibrium
properties. However we believe that in a realistic scenario, off-equilibrium properties are
essential to justify working within a Nash-implementation framework. Nash equilibrium
is an appropriate solution concept for complete information games i.e. games where it is
assumed that all agents have complete knowledge about each others utility functions and
also each agent knows that others know about his utility functions and so on (infinite
hierarchy of beliefs). We are proposing this mechanism to be used in an informationally,
and possibly physically, decentralized network setting like the Internet. The root of delv-
ing into mechanism design is that the designer doesn’t have information about the utility
functions, so to assume that agents themselves have all the information is impractical,
especially for communications settings. In absence of complete information with agents,
Nash implementation has still been used in literature - the justification being online or
offline learning. In this formulation, before playing the actual game, agents participate in
a multi-round learning process. After the agents have learnt about each others utilities
(or more specifically the equilibrium action) they play the actual one-shot game.
In order to make the above learning model practical, there have to be real incentives
involved for learning correctly. It is expected that while the learning process is still
going on, in every round agents will quote demands and prices and receive allocation
and taxes through the contract. We are interested in dealing with constrained resource
allocation problems where the constraints could possibly be of a hard nature i.e. impos-
sible to violate. An instance of this is the capacity constraint in unicast and multi-rate
multicast examples. Hence if one assumes the learning model, then a necessary prop-
erty for the mechanism would be that allocation is always (even off-equilibrium) feasible,
since during the learning process agents will be playing off-equilibrium. To a lesser ex-
tent, if one is interested in SBB then same would have to be true of SBB as well. It
is for these reasons that we introduced the proportional allocation, as a distinct feature
of our mechanism, as opposed to the simple allocation used in [Healy and Mathevet,
2012], [Kakhbod and Teneketzis, 2013a], where allocation equals demand, i.e. x = y
everywhere.
Since the mid-90s, various learning models in Mechanism design and Game theory
have been extensively studied. Readers may refer to [Healy and Mathevet, 2012] for
studying how mechanism design and learning are handled together. Also one may re-
fer to [Young, 2004], [Fudenberg, 1998], [Tembine, 2012], [Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2009], [Menache and Ozdaglar, 2011], [Lasaulce and Tembine, 2011] for a compendium
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of existing results regarding learning in a strategic set-up.
Now we extend the modification from Section 4.1 to achieve SBB off-equilibrium.
5.1 SBB off-equilibrium
Here we will define fli from (30) differently so that we achieve the property of
∑
i∈N ti = 0
at all points where y ∈ C, not just at NE. From the expressions in (29) as well as the
description of fli below, it will be clear that this method of redistribution only works when
there are sufficient number of agents on every link. So here we will modify assumption
(A4) so that
(A4′) For any l ∈ L, Nl > 5 i.e. there are at least 5 agents on any constraint.
Also, we will only deal with the non-degenerate case where Ali > 0 ∀ l, i. The corre-
sponding results regarding degenerate cases would involve tedious case-by-case analysis
and unnecessarily complicate the analysis of what should be a straightforward addition
to the mechanism.
Now fli is defined in three parts: f
l
i
(
(yj, p
l
j)j∈Nl
j 6=i
)
= fli,1 + f
l
i,2 + f
l
i,3. The three terms
here are individually redistributing the three tax terms from (29).
fli ≡ f
l
i,1 =
1
Nl − 2
∑
j∈Nl
j 6=i
Aljyj
(
p¯l
−i −
plj
Nl − 1
)
(36a)
fli,2 =
Nl
(Nl − 1)2(Nl − 2)
∑
k>m
k,m 6=i
(
plk − p
l
m
)2
(36b)
fli,3 = η
(
fli,3a + f
l
i,3b + f
l
i,3c
)
(36c)
fli,3a =
2c2l
(Nl − 1) (Nl − 2)
∑
k>m
k,m 6=i
plkp
l
m (36d)
fli,3b =
2
Nl − 1
∑
j>q
j,q6=i
[ 1
Nl − 3
∑
k∈Nl
k 6=i,j,q
pljp
l
qφ(yk) +
1
Nl − 2
∑
k∈Nl
k=j,q
pljp
l
qφ(yk)
]
(36e)
where φ(yk) = A
2
kly
2
k − 2clAklyk. For f
l
i,3c define the set B , {j, q} ∩ {k, s},
fli,3c =
4
Nl − 1
∑
j>q
j,q6=i
[
1
Nl − 4
∑
k>s
k,s6=i
|B|=0
ψ+
1
Nl − 3
∑
k>s
k,s6=i
|B|=1
ψ+
1
Nl − 2
∑
k>s
k,s6=i
k=j,s=q
ψ
]
(37)
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where ψ = ψ(plj, p
l
q, yk, ys) = p
l
jp
l
q (Aklyk) (Aslys). It is this last expression that
necessitates the assumption (A4′). We will denote the game with the above modified
taxes with G′′.
Lemma 5.1 (Strong Budget Balance on and off-NE). For the game G′′, for all points
in the message space S where y ∈ C∑
i∈N
Ti =
∑
i∈N
∑
l∈Li
T li = 0 (SBB)
Proof. By rearranging the above sum:
∑
i∈N
∑
l∈Li
T li =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Nl T
l
i , we can see
that it will be sufficient if we show that for any constraint l ∈ L,
∑
i∈Nl
T li = 0 ⇔
∑
i∈Nl
tli =
∑
i∈Nl
fli
(
(yj, p
l
j)j∈Nl
j 6=i
)
(38)
We will again show this term-by-term; we have already shown in the proof of Lemma 4.9
that the sum of fli,1 is equal to the sum of payment (first) term from t
l
i, similarly the
sum of fli,2 and f
l
i,3 will be shown to be equal to the sum of the second and third terms
from tli, respectively. Starting from the second term∑
i∈Nl
(
pli − p¯
l
−i
)2
=
∑
i∈Nl
(pli)
2 +
(
p¯l
−i
)2
− 2plip¯
l
−i (39a)
=
Nl
Nl − 1
∑
i∈Nl
(pli)
2 −
2Nl
(Nl − 1)2
∑
k,m∈Nl
k>m
plkp
l
m (39b)
=
Nl
(Nl − 1)2
[
(Nl − 1)
∑
i∈Nl
(pli)
2 − 2
∑
k,m∈Nl
k>m
plkp
l
m
]
=
Nl
(Nl − 1)2
∑
k,m∈Nl
k>m
(
plk − p
l
m
)2
(39c)
Now observing ∑
k,m∈Nl
k>m
(
plk − p
l
m
)2
=
1
Nl − 2
∑
i∈Nl
∑
k,m∈Nl
k>m
k,m 6=i
(
plk − p
l
m
)2
(40)
we get the equality of second terms. For the third term∑
i∈Nl
η pljp¯
l
−j
(
cl −
∑
k∈Nl
αlkyk
)2
= η c2l
∑
j∈Nl
pjp¯
l
−j +
∑
j∈Nl
η pjp¯
l
−j
(∑
k∈Nl
φ(yk)
)
(41a)
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+2η
∑
j∈Nl
pjp¯
l
−j
(∑
k>m
AklAmlykym
)
≡ η (T1 + T2 + T3) (41b)
where as before φ(yk) = A
2
kly
2
k − 2clAklyk. Here we will equate T1, T2, T3 with the sum
of fli,3a, f
l
i,3b, f
l
i,3c, respectively.
c2l
∑
j∈Nl
pjp¯
l
−j =
2c2l
Nl − 1
∑
k>m
plkp
l
m =
2c2l
(Nl − 1)(Nl − 2)
∑
i∈Nl
∑
k>m
k,m 6=i
plkp
l
m (42)
This completes fi,3a, now for fi,3b∑
j∈Nl
pjp¯
l
−j
(∑
k∈Nl
φ(yk)
)
=
2
Nl − 1
∑
j>m
∑
k∈Nl
pljp
l
mφ(yk) (43a)
=
2
Nl − 1
∑
j>m
( ∑
k 6=j,m
pljp
l
mφ(yk) +
∑
k=j,m
pljp
l
mφ(yk)
)
(43b)
=
2
Nl − 1
∑
i∈Nl
∑
j>m
j,m 6=i
(
1
Nl − 3
∑
k 6=i,j,m
pljp
l
mφ(yk) +
1
Nl − 2
∑
k=j,m
pljp
l
mφ(yk)
)
(43c)
This completes fi,3b and finally the sum for fi,3c can be shown in the same way as above.
Hence after comparing the sum of all three terms from tli we have indeed proved (38).
Now just as before, we check individual rationality (for the modified gameG′′). Overall
utility for agent i after redistribution, at NE, is
ûi = vi(xi) − xi
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l +
∑
l∈Li
fli,1 + f
l
i,2 + f
l
i,3 (44)
where the last summation is calculated at NE. At NE, we have equal prices, hence
from (36b) it is clear that
∑
l∈Li
fli,2 term is zero. Since we are only dealing with the
non-degenerate case in this section, it is clear from the definition of fli,1 (see (36a)) that∑
l∈Li
fli,1 > 0. We know already, from Lemma 4.7, that vi(xi)−xi
∑
l∈Li
Alip
l−vi(0) >
0, furthermore since the functions vi are strictly concave and xi > di > 0 (by assumption
(A2)) we can bound the difference in above inequality by a value bigger than zero.
Now note that fli,3 is multiplied by a positive factor η which is still to be chosen. Since
prices pl, demand/allocation yi and coefficients Ali are all absolutely bounded, we can
always make the contribution of
∑
l∈Li
fli,3 small enough (without having the knowledge
of equilibrium values in advance) so that the overall utility in (44) is bigger than vi(0).
Hence we have individual rationality here as well.
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6 Generalizations
Three quite interesting generalizations arise immediately from the set-up and analysis
in this paper. The first is a case where agents have utilities based on a vector allocation
rather than a scalar allocation i.e., the multiple goods scenario. The objective in this
case will be written as ∑
i∈N
vi(xi) with xi ∈ R
Di
+ . (45)
Note that the assumption of strict concavity can still be made. In a communications
scenario, such an example can arise if the Internet agents have utility based on throughput
as well as delay or packet error rate. In the case of the local public goods problem and
in particular its instance that models the interaction between wireless agents, vector
allocation for agent i models the power level of all users that can interfere with i. In this
case the problem (CPlpb) can be restated as
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (Cvlpb)
s.t. xi ∈ R
Di
+ ∀ i ∈ N (46a)
s.t. Eki
⊤
xi = E
k
j
⊤
xj ∀ i, j ∈ Nk, ∀ k ∈ K (46b)
where Nk as before denote localities, however they needn’t be disjoint now. Note that
in the vector equations (46b), multiplication by matrices Eki accomplishes the task of
selecting some coordinates from xi.
The second generalization is with problems which can be equivalently formulated in the
form of (CP), but perhaps with the help of auxiliary variables. Consider the multi-rate
multicast system, in which agents are divided into multicast groups, where agents within
a multicast group communicate with exactly the same data but possibly at different
quality (information rate) for each agent. This problem has both - private and public
goods characteristics. Just like unicast, the limited capacity on links creates constraints
on allocation here. However for saving bandwidth, only the highest demanded rate
from each multicast group is transmitted on every link. This means that resources are
directly shared within every group. If we index agents by a double-index ki ∈ N where
k represents their multicast group and i is the sub-index within the multicast group k,
we can state the optimization problem as
max
x∈RN
+
∑
ki∈N
vki(xki) (CPm)
s.t.
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{αlkixki} 6 c
l ∀ l ∈ L (47)
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here Kl represents the set of multicast groups present on link l and Glk represents the
set of sub-indices from multicast group k, that are present on link l. Mathematically,
the important property to note above is that the feasibility region is indeed a polytope
(since the constraints are piecewise linear). We can easily linearize the above by using
auxiliary variables mlk as proxies for max
i∈Glk
{αlkixki} indexed by group and link as follows
max
x,m
∑
ki∈N
vki(xki) (CP
′
m)
s.t. αlkixki 6 m
l
k ∀ i ∈ G
l
k, k ∈ K
l, l ∈ L (48a)
s.t.
∑
k∈Kl
mlk 6 c
l ∀ l ∈ L. (48b)
In the presence of auxiliary variables, the construction of the mechanism (esp. taxes)
are slightly different in nature but follow the same philosophy as in this paper. Readers
may refer to [Kakhbod and Teneketzis, 2013b], [Sinha and Anastasopoulos, 2013] for a
full implementing mechanism specifically for the multi-rate multicast problem. Other
works for the multicast problem include finding decentralized algorithms to achieve
social utility maximizing allocation [Kar et al., 2001], [Stoenescu et al., 2007] as well
as determining optimal allocation via max-min fairness [Sarkar and Tassiulas, 1999],
[Sarkar and Tassiulas, 2002]. The incorporation of this model into the unified design
methodology is a research topic the authors are currently working on.
The third possible generalization would be where the constraint set, instead of being a
polytope, is taken as general convex set (satisfying assumptions from Section 2.3). If one
represents the centralized problem in the form a general convex optimization problem
max
x,m
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (49a)
s.t. gl(x) 6 0 ∀ l ∈ L, (49b)
then, looking at the Lagrangian
L(x, λ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) −
∑
l∈L
λlgl(x), (50)
one can construct the first term (payment) in the tax (see (17b)) in a similar way as
before. After this, the rest of tax terms can be analogously constructed from the KKT
conditions.
The aforementioned generalizations together can lead to fully implementing mecha-
nisms with minimal message space that can solve an even larger class of problems of
interest.
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We conclude with a note on the robustness properties of these mechanisms that we
would like to investigate. Recently there has been a lot of work related to robustness in
mechanism design7. In addition to investigating the learning properties of our mechanism,
we are also interested in investigating robustness of our mechanism (w.r.t. information
i.e. beliefs of agents) and how the two might be related.
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